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Courts view “data structures,” the mechanism by which computers store
data in meaningful relationships, differently than do computer scientists.
While computer scientists recognize that data structures have aspects that
are both physical (how they are stored in memory) and logical (the
relationships among the stored information), the Federal Circuit, in its
attempts to set clear standards of the scope of patentability of data
structures, has not fully appreciated their dualistic nature. This i-brief
explains what data structures are, explores how courts have wrestled with
setting a limiting principle to determine their patentability, and discusses
the resultant impact on claim drafting.

INTRODUCTION
¶1

You’re a contestant on the TV quiz show “Jeopardy!” Host Alex Trebek throws a softball by stating,

“This is the continent with the largest area.” Confident, you ring in and declare “Asia.” “Wrong,” Alex
replies. Another contestant rings in and answers, “What is Asia?” “Correct” says Alex. In “Jeopardy!”, you
must respond in the form of a question. If you do not, you lose even if you know the correct response.
¶2

Although the above example trivializes the issue, it suggests how patent law treats data structures.

Drawn to a machine or manufacture, data structures have been found to pass muster under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, when drawn to a method, data structures have been found to be nonstatutory subject matter and
unpatentable as an abstract idea. As in Jeopardy!, the data structure in question may be rewarded by the
patent laws for its physical manifestation but penalized for its logical conceptualization. For computer
scientists, however, the physical and logical aspects of a data structure are two sides of the same coin.
¶3

Obtaining a patent on a data structure depends on which side of the coin the U.S. Patent and

Trademark Office (“PTO”) sees. The first hurdle that an invention must overcome to be patented is 35 U.S.C.
§ 101: is the subject matter of the invention of the type recognized by the patent laws? Thomas Jefferson,
who authored the Patent Act of 1793, wrote that patentable inventions are those that constitute “any new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”2
The current language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 defines statutory subject matter identical to Jefferson’s formulation,
except that “art” is replaced with “process.” Thus, statutory subject matter today comprises a new, useful
type of process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
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¶4

To lend perspective, these days the PTO rejects very few claims in patent applications for failing to

meet § 101. The rejections are usually based on 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 (does prior art render the claimed
invention respectively not “new” or render it obvious) and 35 U.S.C. § 112 (is the claimed invention
inadequately disclosed or claimed). The legislative history accompanying the Patent Act of 1952 notes that
patentability extends to “anything under the sun that is made by man.”3 In Diamond v. Diehr,4 which
affirmed the modern judicial view that computer-related inventions are patentable, the Supreme Court
acknowledged as much. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin’l Group, Inc., the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit further remarked that “the repetitive use of the expansive term ‘any’ in § 101 shows
Congress’s intent not to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained
beyond those specifically recited in § 101.”5 Broad though it might be, § 101 excludes laws of nature,
physical phenomena and abstract ideas. “A new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the
wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc 2 ; nor
could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.’”6 Nor can one patent mere abstract ideas, a critical admonition that
courts have made in the context of computer-related inventions.
¶5

Thus, for a patent claim related to a data structure, if drawn to a machine or manufacture—the

physical aspect of the data structure—precedent permits the claim to survive § 101. But, if drawn to a
process—the logical aspect of the data structure—the data structure may be rejected as an abstract idea.
When it comes to data structures, then, the Federal Circuit views the logical “ghost” as essentially
unpatentable subject matter, but the “machine” that the ghost animates as patentable subject matter.
¶6

While they may not be entirely familiar with the judicial terrain of data structures, patent attorneys

drafting patent claims directed to data structures know that they are on firmer ground when emphasizing the
“physical” nature of the data structure and deemphasizing the “logical” nature of data structures. This i-brief
explains what data structures are, explores how courts have wrestled with setting a limiting principle to
determine their patentability, and discusses the resultant impact on claim drafting.

ROLE OF DATA STRUCTURES
¶7

A key difference between a shopping list scribbled on a scrap of paper and the same shopping list

stored in a computer is what makes computers so useful in navigating oceans of information: the computer
shopping list is stored by means of a data structure which permits the data to be manipulated.
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¶8

Typical data structures include the array, the stack, the linked list, the tree, and also “classes.”7

Computer scientists have devoted substantial efforts to analyzing these and other data structures and finding
successful ways to use them efficiently in practice. Despite these efforts, there is no canonical definition of
“data structure.” Nevertheless, the plasticity of its definition is rather secondary for computer science because
the precise definition of “data structure” is simply not critic al to the development and use of data structures.
Computer scientists know a data structure when they see one. Unfortunately, in assessing whether the data
structures before them are patentable, courts have failed to completely appreciate the nature of data structures
in an effort to determine their patentability and, consequently, have become mired in difficult issues of patent
law.

PLASTICITY OF THE M EANING OF DATA STRUCTURE
¶9

The problem lies in the ontology of data structures—what “is” a data structure? Is it a relationship

among data, or the representation of that data as stored in memory, or both?
¶10

Computer science understands that this question dramatizes the distinction between logical and

physical representations of data. As described below, logical representations emphasize data relationships
and how the data are related from the view of the computer user. Physical representations emphasize issues
of effectively and efficiently storing data in memory. These concepts apply to systems as well. For example,
in relational database design one performs “logical database design” before “physical database design.”8
Logical database design refers to specifying user-defined data relationships in “schemas” by mapping those
relationships with each other.9 Physical database design “is the process of choosing specific storage
structures and access paths . . . to achieve good performance for the various database applications.”10
¶11

Logical and physical data representations are inextricably bound. They cannot exist independently.

In a world where computers had no physical storage structures, there could exist no logical relationships
among data in the first place. And, in a world where computers had only physical storage, but no logical
relationships among data, computer use would be an onerous task of bit-by-bit manipulation comparable to

7
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using an extremely complex electronic abacus. Neither of these counterfactual worlds exists, however,
because the logical and the physical share a mutual dependency.
¶12

Neverthele ss, many notions of “data structures” ignore the physical representation in favor of the

logical. This is understandable. Most computer professionals do not need to bother with specifying the
physical storage of data in computer memory. Rather, physical storage considerations, important as they may
be, are tasks assigned to high-level programming languages, applications programs and operating systems. In
fact, best practices often involve “hiding” physical storage problems from the computer user.
¶13

Consequently, many definitions of “data structure” emphasize logical, not physical, relationships. As

but one example, a current computer science text defines “data structure” as “a construct within a
programming language that stores a collection of data.”11 A data structure is here seen as a construct in a
programming language, not its manifestation in memory. Moreover, the notion of a “construct” implies
something that is abstract. Many computer science texts, monographs and dictionaries are consistent with this
definition and stress the logicality of data structures while deemphasizing or ignoring altogether their
physicality. 12
¶14

Other definitions of “data structure”, however, acknowledge the term’s duality. They recognize that

data structures are data stored in a certain logical way—but in physical memory. Examples of this broader
approach are found in the IBM Dictionary of Computing.13 One entry defines a “logical data structure” and a
separate entry a “physical data structure.” A “logical data structure” is “the relationship among data elements
from the point of view of an end user.”14 A “physical data structure” is “the form in which data is stored on
storage media.”15 Other authorities recognize that the logicality of a data structure is paired with a physical
component.16
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¶15

As one author of a computer science monograph observed, “[a]ny discussion of data structures is

fraught with the potential for confusion, because the term ‘data structure’ has at least four distinct, but related,
meanings.”17 None of the meanings given by this author, however, explicitly builds in the requirement of
physical memory for the meaning of data structure. On top of all this, one computing dictionary practically
ignores the logical aspect, defining data structure as “[t]he physical layout of data.”18
¶16

This brief survey of the meanings given “data structure” is not meant to imply that any of the

definitions are clearly “right” and others clearly “wrong.” Each is a defensible definition depending on
context, and there is considerable overlap, although many computer scientists would agree that a full
understanding of the term should take into account both its logical and physical aspects. Rather, the survey is
meant to reveal that, in the final analysis, the meaning of “data structure” is a plastic, context-dependent
notion.
J UDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF DATA STRUCTURES
¶17

This plasticity in the definition of data structures, however, has been the source of judicial difficulties.

Data structures, like other aspects of computer-related inventions, have met with controversy when it comes
to their patentability. A good introduction to the tricky issues associated with patenting data structures is a
tandem of Federal Circuit cases issued within two weeks of each other in 1994: In re Warmerdam,19 where
five method claims to data structures were deemed unpatentable though one system claim was found
patentable, and In re Lowry,20 where system claims to data structures were found patentable.
¶18

In In re Warmerdam, the subject invention was designed to help a robot avoid collision with fixed or

moving objects. Each of these objects was deemed to be enclosed by a bubble.21 If the robot came into
contact with the bubble’s edge, it represented a collision. 22 To gain greater accuracy, however, each object
contained a set of smaller bubbles to enable more granular collision-avoidance calculations.23 This made for a
“bubble hierarchy.”24 Warmerdam’s claimed innovation was in locating the bubble hierarchy “along the
medial axis of the object.”25
¶19

The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of six claims. Claims 1-4 were

directed to a “method for generating a data structure” (emphasis added).26 Claim 5 was directed to a “machine
having a memory which contains data representing a bubble hierarchy generated by the method of any of
17
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Claims 1 through 4” (emphasis added).27 Claim 6 was directed to a “data structure generated by the method
of any of Claims 1 through 4” (emphasis added).28
¶20

On appeal, the Federal Circuit sustained the rejection of cla ims 1-4 and 6 for failing § 101 and found

claim 5—the sole machine claim—the only patentable claim. What, asked the Federal Circuit, is a “data
structure”? As the term was not defined in the specification, the court looked to the IEEE Standard Computer
Dictionary, which defined it as a “physical or logical relationship among data elements, designed to support
specific data manipulation functions.’”29 It is unclear why the Federal Circuit emphasized “physical or
logical” in the text. Indeed, that the data structure appears to have a physical component, as required by the
IEEE definition, undermines the court’s conclusion that the data structure represented “abstract ideas.” The
physicality of Claim 5 implies a machine-like (or manufacture-like) compliance with § 101.
¶21

Compounding this difficulty, the Federal Circuit attempted to distinguish the bubble hierarchy

method claims found unpatentable in Warmerdam with certain data structures found patentable in In re
Bradley.30 The Bradley data structure employed firmware programmed with microcode 31 which the court
described as “a physical interconnected arrangement of hardware and thus embraced by the term
‘machine.’”32 Once again, the IEEE definition of data structure as “logical or physical” does not support the
Federal Circuit’s more limited interpretation of the data structure as physical. Nevertheless, the court did not
find the precise definition of “data structure” to be an independent ground for denying patentability.
¶22

Claim 5, the only patentable claim according to the Warmerdam court began: “A machine having a

memory which contains data representing a bubble hierarchy . . . .”33 In reversing the Board of Patent
Appeals, the court acknowledged that the “machine” of Claim 5 was “presumably a general purpose
computer,” and held that “Claim 5 is for a machine, and is clearly patentable subject matter” under § 101. 34
Claims 1-4, on the other hand, claimed “[a] method for generating a data structure . . . .”35 Siding with the
appellant’s argument, the Federal Circuit noted that claim 1, from which the other three method claims
depended, was broad enough to cover methods involving physically measuring an object with a ruler or even
“eyeballing” it.36 Thus, it was not specifically drawn to a mathematical algorithm. And though the court
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noted that “the preferred, and it appears the only practical, embodiment of the method involves steps which
are essentially mathematical in nature, i.e., utilization of the Hilditch Skeletonization method to locate the
medial axis,”37 it concluded, nonetheless, that “the claim involves no more than the manipulation of abstract
ideas”, and was thus unpatentable under § 101. 38 Nor did the method claims produce physical activity that
precluded a § 101 rejection. 39 As a result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO rejection of these four method
claims which did no more than manipulate “abstract ideas” as well as claim 6 because it was simply “another
way of describing the manipulation of ideas contained in claims 1-4.”40 The practical lesson of Warmerdam
is that data structures are patentable under § 101 when directed to a machine, but may not be patentable when
drawn to a method of data manipulation.
¶23

Two weeks after Warmerdam, the Federal Circuit issued another decision refining the scope of

patentability of data structures. In In re Lowry,41 the court had before it an appeal from the Board of Patent
Appeals on an application entitled “Data Processing System Having a Data Structure With a Single, Simple
Primitive.”42 The claimed invention was directed to “the storage, use and management of information
residing in a memory.”43
¶24

The Lowry court understood the meaning of “data structure” as “the physical implementation of a data

model’s organization of the data”, where a “data model” was a “framework for organizing and representing
information used by an application program” (emphasis added).44 Thus, a data model was a framework for
organizing data, and data structures the means to physically implement the organization. It is interesting that
“data structure” was here defined as a physical creature, where in Warmerdam it was both physical and
logical (and the physical was there deemphasized).
¶25

Lowry’s invention, the court believed, blended the best features of “functionally expressive” data

models and “structurally expressive” ones.45 Functionally expressive data models, declared the court, enabled
complex nesting operations 46 using large blocks of data, but these models have relatively fewer applications
and more complex interfaces. “Structurally expressive data models,” on the other hand, contained “more
varied data structures capable of representing accurately complex information,” but made complex nesting
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operations “quite difficult.” Lowry described “attribute data objects” (“ADOs”) composed of “sequences of
bits which are stored in the memory as electrical (or magnetic) signals that represent information.”47 Claim 1
began: “1. A memory for storing data for access by an application program being executed on a data
processing system, comprising: a data structure stored in said memory . . . .”48 (emphasis added). The
Examiner rejected claim 1 and the four claims dependent on it under § 101 as nonstatutory subject matter.
¶26

The PTO Board of Appeals reversed the Examiner, finding that the claim “recited an article of

manufacture” for being “directed to a memory containing stored information” 49 and thus satisfied 101. 50
Only the Examiner’s rejections under § 102 and § 103, undisturbed by the Board, were on appeal, yielding
some regrettable reasoning by the Federal Circuit.
¶27

The § 102 and § 103 rejections flesh out the Federal Circuit’s understanding of data structures, with

provocative implications for interpreting data structures under § 101. The § 102 and § 103 rejections were
founded on the “printed matter” doctrine, which permits patenting only if there is a “’new and unobvious
functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.’”51 The Board had “framed the question
as whether a new, nonobvious functional relationship exists between the printed matter (data structure with
ADOs) and the substrate (memory).”52 Finding no functional relationship, the Board determined that Lowry
could not distinguish his claimed invention on § 102 or § 103 grounds over the prior art, a U.S. patent that
disclosed “a CPU using a memory and containing stored data in a data structure . . . .”53 In doing so, said the
Federal Circuit, the Board “erroneously extended a printed matter rejection under § 102 and § 103 to a new
field in this case, which involves information stored in memory.”54
¶28

As an initial matter, said the Federal Circuit , the “printed matter” rejection “’stands on questionable

legal and logical footing’” where, as here, the invention is processed not by the mind but by a computer.55 In
any event, said the Federal Circuit, the Board misunderstood the true nature of Lowry’s innovative data
structures. But in distinguishing Lowry’s data structures from printed matter, the Federal Circuit’s approach
to data structures was inconsistent with its Warmerdam opinion issued just two weeks earlier.56 The Federal
Circuit began: “In Lowry’s invention, the stored data adopt no physical ‘structure’ per se. Rather the stored
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data exists as a collection of bits having information about relationships between the ADOs. Yet this is the
essence of electronic structure.”57
¶29

Thus, the “essence of electronic structure” is to store bits containing information about

“relationships,” but the stored data do not have a “physical structure.” However, the Federal Circuit then
went on to say, “[i]n short, Lowry’s data structures are physical entities that provide increased efficiency in
computer operation” (emphasis added).58 Because Lowry’s innovative data structures were physical and
promote computer efficiency, they were “not analogous to printed matter,” thus the Board’s § 102 and § 103
rejections must be reversed.
¶30

Which is it? Do Lowry’s data structures have “no physical ‘structure’ per se” or are they “physical

entities”? Within one page, the Federal Circuit gives seemingly contradictory explanations. This difficulty
mirrors that in Warmerdam where the Federal Circuit defined a data structure as a “physical or logical
relationship among data elements.”59 As a matter of computer science, the Federal Circuit was right on both
counts: data structures have logical and physical aspects. Unfortunately, this complicates things as a matter of
patent law, as the following shows.
¶31

A “data structure” is context-dependent. For example, consider a simple array data structure

containing the numbers 1, 2 and 3 called firstThree[]. The first position (“element”) in the data structure
firstThree[] contains the “1,” second position the “2,” and third position the “3.” Assume that the memory
reserved for firstThree[] contains ten free positions with which to store the three-position list. Thus, the list
can occupy any of physical memory locations 0-2, 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, 4-6, 5-7, 6-8, or 7-9.60 It can start at any of
physical locations 0-7. However, the logical relationships of the data are fixed no matter where the data is
stored physically: “1” always immediately precedes “2” by one position, and “2” always immediately
precedes “3” by one position – no matter whether “1” occupies position 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7.
¶32

It can get even trickier in trying to understand the precise relationship of the logical to the physical

aspect of data structures. The computer may not have stored the logically related items adjacent to each other
in physical memory. As mentioned above, memory tasks are typically hidden from the user. In other words,
for firstThree[], the “1” and “2” may be stored adjacent to each other, but “3” may be stored non-adjacently
and many bytes away in memory. Still, the programmer sees the relationship logically, no matter where the
“3” is stored physically: it remains 1, 2, 3. Thus, the firstThree[] array, on its face sequential as a logical
matter, may in physical memory be scattered.
¶33

Trickier still is the common use of “pointers” in a language like C++, and their use in the data

structures represented by linked lists. A linked list is a sequential collection of structures, connected or
57
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“linked” by pointers. Linked lists are more flexible than arrays for holding lists of items. A linked list can
grow as necessary while an array is limited to the fixed number of elements initially declared for it. A pointer
contains a memory address of a variable; the variable contains a specific value. For example, assume the
value of a variable named “temperature” is “98.6.” A pointer to “temperature” contains not 98.6 but a
memory address, e.g., 0x0066FDEC.
¶34

To illustrate, assume that the data items in firstThree[] are stored in a linked list data structure. “1,”

“2” and “3” can be stored in three separate physical memory locations, linked by a pointer that “remembers”
where to access them. The linked list thus appears as a logical sequence.
¶35

Because pointer-based manipulation is essentially use of the physical aspects of data structures

(memory) to organize the logical aspects of data structures (the relationships), it further exposes the duality of
the meaning of “data structure.” In other words, the array data structure is different from a linked list data
structure because the programmer deals only with the array positions and the computer hides all memory
aspects. With linked lists, on the other hand, the programmer wants to deal with some memory aspects—
pointers. Thus, the linked list data structure, by its very nature, has a physical aspect beyond the logical:
memory address manipulation, by pointers that point to memory addresses. Even so, the programmer does
not directly manipulate the specific memory address in the hardware (e.g., 0x0066FDEC). Instead, the
programmer declares a pointer variable that points to a stored address.
¶36

In light of the discussion above, it is understandable why the Federal Circuit’s views of “data

structure” in Warmerdam and Lowry cannot easily be harmonized. A data structure can have logical
properties, or as Lowry put it, be “a collection of bits having information about relationships.”61 This is
analogous to the logical relationship of “1” to “2” – always preceding it by one position, no matter where
stored. And, a data structure can have physical properties, or as Lowry put it represent “physical entities”
with “specific electrical or magnetic structural elements in a memory.”62 This is analogous to the physical
storage of “1” at either position 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 in an array.

IMPACT ON CLAIM DRAFTING
¶37

While Warmerdam and Lowry reveal that a physically understood data structure can satisfy § 101 as

drawn to a machine or manufacture, Warmerdam reveals that a logically understood data structure expressed
in method claims can be rejected under § 101 as an “abstract idea.” Yet, in the computer program employing
it, the data structure may have a single resulting functionality. The raison d’être of computers, after all, is
their functionality, i.e., what a computer provides the end-user. So whether data structures are understood in

61
62

Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1583.
Id. at 1583-4.

logical terms, or physical terms, or both, is an important, but secondary, question. First and foremost is
functionality: what data structures can do.
¶38

Inasmuch as Warmerdam found essentially the same data structure unpatentable when drawn to a

method claim, but patentable when drawn to a machine claim, the physical/logical duality of a data structure
can result in strategic claim drafting. Emphasizing the physical nature of a data structure, one might draft a
claim directed to an article of manufacture or machine because if characterized as a method, the claim may
not survive § 101.
¶39

Indeed, PTO procedures encourage as much. Effective March 29, 1996, the PTO amended the

detailed Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”), a vade mecum for Examiners directed to all areas
of the technical arts, to include section 2106, commonly known as the Examination Guidelines for ComputerRelated Inventions. In particular, the PTO’s MPEP rewards claiming software as an article of manufacture.
Specifically, “a claimed computer-readable medium encoded with a data structure defines structural and
functional interrelationships between the data structure and the computer software and hardware components
which permit the data structure’s functionality to be realized, and is thus statutory.”63 In contrast, “[d]ata
structures not claimed as embodied in computer-readable media are descriptive material per se and are not
statutory because they are not capable of causing functional change in the computer.”64 This has become
known as a so-called “Beauregard claim,” after PTO proceedings referenced in In re Beauregard.65 Thus,
software claimed as an article of manufacture—that is, software embodied on a computer-readable medium—
is patentable.
¶40

Consequently, it is hardly surprising that a November 2003 search of the PTO database reveals that

the phrase “computer-readable medium” appears in the claims of over 5,500 issued U.S. patents. Many if not
most presumably cover software expressed as an article of manufacture or a machine, two of the four
statutory categories satisfying 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the patent laws.66
¶41

Claims define the legal scope of the invention. Indeed, “[t]he name of the game is the claim.”67

Some believe that strategic claim drafting exalts form over substance, where claim language can confer
patentability on data structures as understood physically, but not logically. To the extent that the courts or
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MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(a).
Id.
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53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,651,243, issued Nov. 18, 2003, provides, as claim 31:
“A computer program product in a computer-readable medium for use in a data processing system for profiling an
executing program, the computer program product comprising:
first instructions for performing sample-based profiling of the executing program;
second instructions for generating, for each sample period, a tree data structure in which nodes of the tree data
structure represent routines of the program that execute during the sample period; and
third instructions for merging, in response to a determination of completion of the execution of the program, tree
data structures from each sample period into a resulting tree data structure.” (emphasis added).
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In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Congress wish to refine standards for software patentability to minimize strategic claim-drafting, they will
need to appreciate properly the plasticity of the meaning of “data structures.”

